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MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS
CONSEQUENCES (2012). Pp. 221. Hardcover $24.95.
Mary Dudziak's book War Time is expressive of a widespread unease with the way
America went to war after 9/11.1 Mainly, it is a work of cultural and intellectual history
in which, as expressed by the title, the concepts of war and time are separated for the
purposes of analysis and then brought back together in a productive relationship -
though with a distinct emphasis on the latter rather than the former. Dudziak is most
interested in understanding what makes a historical period a particular temporary
"time." 2 She is less interested in investigating "war," although this does not detract from
the genuine insights yielded by the book.
Dudziak advances her argument on the nature of "wartime" by employing a
remarkable variety of material concerning twentieth and twenty-first century wars. In
particular, her thought-provoking analysis places the Cold War and the post-9/11 "war
on terror" in a very useful relationship, noting the ambiguity of both as wartime. 3 The
book also, less successfully, suggests that more conventional wars, such as World War
II, had the same ambiguous character. 4 But this latter contention is not essential to the
book's suggestive theme of the problems caused by an apparently endless state of
wartime in a constitutional democracy. 5
Dudziak's project could have been called Whatever Happened to Peacetime?
When was the last time America agreed that it was at peace? Her argument implies that
we have become so inured to a militarized foreign policy, fighting wars (big and small),
and indefinite in-between periods such as the Cold War that we have lost our sense of
what constitutes "peacetime." Nonetheless, we retain the traditional expectation that
wartime is temporary and that peacetime automatically follows wartime.6 It is this mode
* Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School.
1. MARY L. DUDzIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 8-9 (2012).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 68-76,112-20.
4. Id. at 62.
5. Id. at 8 ("Wartime has become the only kind of time we have, and therefore is a time within which
American politics must function.").
6. Id. at 15-16.
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of thinking that Dudziak highlights and puts in question.
We might suppose that peacetime is a period when we are not engaged in a
conventional war. It has been claimed, for example, that President Eisenhower presided
over such a period after the Korean War ended.7 Under Eisenhower, there were plenty of
foreign commitments and covert operations, but no repetition of the Korea experience.
It is also hard to understand the period after the end of the Cold War as wartime. 9
President Clinton presided over a period that many saw as quiet on the foreign front, 10
certainly to the dismay of those elites who felt that genuine threats, such as Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, persisted.1 1
To this sort of thinking, Dudziak has two rejoinders, one more persuasive than the
other. While Eisenhower showed little inclination to plunge into another conventional
war,12 concentrating on conflicts the size of Korea ignores that the Truman, Eisenhower
and Kennedy administrations occurred during the height of the Cold War and
demonstrates time and again the ambiguous nature of that conflict. If the Cold War was
a real conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union which involved the use of
military power, then what citizens experienced under Eisenhower was certainly not
"peace."l4 This point is well taken. Dudziak goes much further, however, and contends,
largely on the basis of a review of military medals awarded, that essentially the entire
twentieth century was wartime.15
To be sure, Dudziak is on solid ground when, like many historians, she emphasizes
the neglected importance of the many "small wars"1 6 in which the United States was
involved in the twentieth century, particularly in Latin America. 17 She argues that "[i]t is
only through forgetting the small wars that so much of American history is remembered
as peacetime."18 But Dudziak determinedly ignores the issue of the relative significance
of America's various and very different twentieth-century military conflicts to our post-
9/11 reality. One plausible policy-oriented way to distinguish among America's wars, for
example, is to take into consideration the importance of the foreign policy objectives
7. See DAVID A. NICHOLS, EISENHOWER 1956: THE PRESIDENT'S YEAR OF CRISIs: SUEZ AND THE BRINK
OF WAR 3-4 (2011) (recounting President Eisenhower's reluctance to engage in any foreign conflict following
the end of the Korean War).
8. See id. at xv.
9. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 100 (discussing the few events closest to "wartime" between the end of the
Cold War and 9/11).
10. Ivo H. DAALDER & I.M. DESTLER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE OVAL OFFICE: PROFILES OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISERS AND THE PRESIDENTS THEY SERVED: FROM JFK TO GEORGE W. BUSH 212-13 (2009).
11. JAMES MANN, RISE OF THE VULCANS: THE HISTORY OF BUSH'S WAR CABINET 236 (2004). See also the
useful review in DEREK CHOLLET & JAMES GOLDGEIER, AMERICA BETWEEN THE WARS, FROM 11/9 TO 9/11:
THE MISUNDERSTOOD YEARS BETWEEN THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL AND THE START OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 187-93 (2008).
12. NICHOLS, supra note 7, at 3-4.
13. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 70-71, 91-92, 80-81.
14. See, e.g., NICHOLS, supra note 7.
15. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 26-32.
16. Id. at 30.
17. Id. at 32. See, e.g., GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND
THE RISE OF THE NEW IMPERIALISM 24, 31-33 (2006).
18. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 31.
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pursued, the costs incurred, both quantitative and qualitative, and, of course, casualties.
Dudziak stays well away from these markers. While wanting to characterize the Cold
War as a period of "small wars, surveillance, and stalemate," 20 she admits that Korea
and Vietnam, certainly two of the most significant and consequential wars in American
history, were "major wars" 21 that, as illustrated by their memorials on the National Mall,
did not last forever. Unfortunately, Dudziak's dogged effort to show that all of our pre-
9/11 reality was an endless wartime sends the analysis in the book off track.
Dudziak's most valuable contributions lie elsewhere. She brings the history of the
Cold War to bear on the seemingly endless "war on terror" that ensued after 9/11.22 In
focusing on the Cold War, Dudziak makes the important point that the metaphor of
"war" can be so mesmerizing that it can cause analysis to go astray.23 The Cold War is
more fruitfully understood as "a period of state-building," 24 rather than wartime. Setting
to one side major wars such as Korea and Vietnam, key developments revolved around
the creation and maintenance of "the national security state" rather than discrete
battles. 25 This is quite helpful in directing our attention to the issue of state capacity and
the relative ability of government officials, particularly those in the executive branch, to
make effective policy decisions.
The Cold War constitutional order appeared to underwrite granting the President
the authority to order the nation to war.2 6 President Truman's 1950 decision to intervene
in Korea without asking for congressional authorization is well known.27 In an especially
insightful discussion, Dudziak correctly emphasizes the enormous authority that flowed,
seemingly automatically, to President Bush as commander in chief after 9/11.28 Instead
of highlighting the unusual character of the "war" he was about to fight against al-Qaeda,
a somewhat diffuse organizational target, Bush chose to assimilate our post-9/11 reality
to World War 1I and the early years of the Cold War and replace Nazis and communists
with terrorists in general.29 Dudziak's discussion helps us understand why this was a
crucial narrative move within the structure of the national security state, but also why it
concealed deep and problematic ambiguities.30
19. This is the approach I take in a forthcoming book, STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2013).
20. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 68.
21. Id. at 73. On the significance of Korea and Vietnam, see, for example, GEORGE C. HERRING,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975 (4th ed. 2002); WILLIAM STUECK,
RETHINKING THE KOREAN WAR: A NEW DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC HISTORY (2002).
22. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 113-14, 118.
23. Id. at 68-69.
24. Id. at 91.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 88 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), which held President Truman's executive order allowing the government to seize steel mills
for operation during war time was an unconstitutional exercise of presidential power).
27. See the discussion in Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the
United Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 621 (1993).
28. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 103-08.
29. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 137 (2010).
30. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 100-07.
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Dudziak's discussion of the Bush administration's reaction to 9/11 is well done,
but even here we should take out the caution flag. Under the rubric of exploring the
meaning of wartime, Dudziak runs together a number of different issues that are best
analyzed separately. At one and the same time, she advances critiques of the
militarization of foreign policy, the concept of a broad "war on terror," and implicitly
raises matters that are more properly considered in terms of what Julian Zelizer has
reminded us are the politics of national security. 31 Meanwhile, amid the concerns of
Dudziak and many others about the novel issues posed by the Guantanamo detainees and
constitutionally questionable surveillance by the National Security Agency, the United
States fought two fairly conventional wars using thousands of ground troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq.32 My specific concern is that we might be led to overlook their
significance if we bought Dudziak's idea that throughout the post-1945 period
(throughout the entire twentieth century!) we were "at war" in the same sense we were at
war in Korea, Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq.33 Dudziak usefully
alerts us to the question of timing - when, exactly, did the Vietnam War begin? 34
and the often disingenuous character of occasional presidential claims that we were in a
World War II-style wartime in the absence of sufficient democratic deliberation. 3 5
However, Dudziak also bypasses any attempt to study the relevant differences and assess
the relative historical significance of the varied military conflicts the United States has
fought.
Here we might usefully reverse the question posed earlier about peacetime and ask
when was the last time there was a consensus that we were in wartime. Dudziak rightly
contends that World War II remains the template for a "real war" for many Americans.36
It featured multiple declarations of war, vast powers given to the President by Congress,
and presidential calls for national sacrifice and austerity, including greatly increased tax
rates to pay for the war.37 So understood, a good case can be made that this "good war"
was the very last real wartime.38 None of America's costly wars since have featured all
of these elements at once, although Korea arguably came close.39 This was partly due to
the ambiguous nature of the Cold War.40 During its long run, presidents appeared to
want the ability to go to war without having the democratic deliberation necessary to
alert the public to the sacrifices war inevitably entails. 4 1
31. See generally JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY-
FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2010).
32. See PETER L. BERGEN, THE LONGEST WAR: THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICA AND AL-
QAEDA 172-77 (2011).
33. See generally DUDZIAK, supra note 1.
34. Id. at 26, 37.
35. Id. at 104-06.
36. Id. at 61-62.
37. See ZELIZER, supra note 31, at 60-80.
38. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 61-62.
39. See STUECK, supra note 21, at 39-83 (detailing the initial stages and wartime atmosphere during the
U.S. initiative in Korea).
40. See DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 72-73.
41. Id. at 90 ("Truman went further than he needed to in greatly expanding the military budget, in American
actions in Korea, and in political repression at home.").
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The equivocal nature of the Cold War and the post-9/11 "war on terror," however,
did not diminish the constitutional, political, policy, social, and cultural realities that
rapidly accrue when the United States puts tens or hundreds of thousands of "boots on
the ground" in foreign locales. As the war in Afghanistan wore on and the war in Iraq
finally came to a conclusion in 2011, the American public was quite credibly said to be
"war-weary." 42 But how could citizens be war-weary in the age of the all-volunteer
military, when President Bush did not ask citizens to pay for the war with increased taxes
and did not invoke a shared sense of national sacrifice? 43 In a democracy, wars on the
scale of Iraq and Afghanistan evidently cannot be fought without public involvement,
without the summoning of the morale necessary to underwrite their painful
consequences. The public clearly stood behind the military after 9/11 and there was a
sense of a common purpose in opposing the threat of terrorism by al-Qaeda.44 Yet, there
is nothing in American history to suggest that such a shared commitment can be
sustained indefinitely amid much travail. We may nod our heads in approval, thinking
this is an obvious point, but it undermines the coherence of Dudziak's project.
Whether intended or not, Dudziak's analysis has the effect of painting all wars the
same, a perspective which is intended to show that we have lost our way when we
45
continually try to reestablish the boundary line between periods of war and peace.
Although this is a valuable cautionary insight, it also involves an unacceptable flattening
of history. While it is likely that Dudziak would not endorse the idea that Vietnam was
equivalent to, say, President Reagan's 1983 invasion of Grenada, that is the effect
produced by her narrative. All wars look the same on Dudziak's account because the
notion of wartime itself lacks a clear boundary.46 The distinctive political, constitutional,
and diplomatic history of each war is smeared together in a way that impedes our
understanding of the unique challenges and historical significance posed by conflicts on
the scale of Vietnam and Iraq.47
We might agree that there is an obvious difference in scale between Grenada and
other "small wars" and interventions like Vietnam that always carry with them the
potential for national catastrophe. Dudziak could still press the point of the lack of a
clear boundary line. When is wartime? 48 For complex reasons of politics, worries about
the use of nuclear weapons, and considerations of international law, post-Korea wars -
including those in Afghanistan and Iraq - have been marked by congressional
authorizations rather than declarations. 49 Such authorizations have a history going back
42. See, e.g., Scott Wilson & Jon Cohen, Post-ABC News Poll Shows Drop in Republican Support for
Afghan War, WASH. PosT (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/post-abc-news-poll-
shows-drop-in-republican-support-for-afghan-war/2012/04/1 1/glQAfl5oBTstory.html.
43. On Bush's failure to ask for national sacrifice, see BERGEN, supra note 32, at 57-58.
44. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 103.
45. Id. at 15-21.
46. Id. at 16-17.
47. Id. at 8.
48. See id. at 15-21.
49. The leading analysis of congressional authorization regarding Afghanistan and Iraq is detailed in Curtis
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to the Eisenhower administration. 50 Yet they are treated by Dudziak and other historians
with some surprise, as if the United States should still be issuing declarations to mark the
boundary crossed when it goes to war.51
This raises a more fundamental issue. In light of the democratic deliberation
implied by such authorizations, why should we be worried about endless wartime?
Dudziak links wartime to the enhancement of centralized state power, especially
executive power.52 Such an expansion of power is said to be justified by the temporary
nature of wartime. 53 Dudziak calls this the "wartime frame," 54 a perspective that
strongly determines the proper role of government. Within the frame, we are reassured
by public officials that after the war, things will return to normal. 55 But if wartime is not
temporary, what has really occurred is a permanent expansion in the power of the state
without sufficient democratic deliberation. 56
Although this thesis is suggestive, it is too broad and undifferentiated. Applied to
the Cold War, it does not work, although this is partly due to the somewhat odd failure of
historians to agree on a periodization of that long struggle. 57 The early Cold War
supervised by Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy was a distinct period and was quite
different from, for example, the era of d6tente under Nixon. 58 Nevertheless, the Cold
War was technically still going on in the 1970s when Congress belatedly tried to
decrease state power by reining in the presidency and elements of the national security
state. 59 President Nixon vetoed the 1973 War Powers Resolution, but on the grounds that
it unacceptably detracted from the president's power over foreign affairs, not that it was
unwise because the nation was in wartime.60 Earlier, President Johnson had not claimed
broad wartime powers even as he initiated the Vietnam War, precisely because he
wanted to avoid alarming the public.61 True, under Johnson and Nixon, the intelligence
agencies carried out secret domestic operations restricting civil liberties in the name of
national security.62 But we would be wrong to ignore the relevance of the secrecy. These
secretive tactics point in the direction of showing the inherent instability of the national
security state instead of a public consensus that the exercise of this sort of power was
accepted because the nation was in a temporary state of wartime.63
50. See Stromseth, supra note 27, at 638.
51. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 104.
52. Id. at 22-26.
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id.
55. Id at 133-34.
56. Id at 21-26, 133-34.
57. See id at 73-74 for Dudziak's conunents on this point.
58. For a discussion of the differences in d6tente under Nixon, see ROBERT DALLEK, PARTNERS IN POWER:
NIXON AND KISSINGER 285-324 (2007).
59. See id. at 137-38.
60. Richard Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, Oct. 24, 1973,
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=402 1. It should be noted that Congress overrode Nixon's
veto. Id
61. See HERRING, supra note 21, at 131-32.
62. Id. at 219-20 (discussing the CIA's surveillance of antiwar leaders as instructed by President Johnson);
see also id. at 279 (discussing the same tactics of President Nixon).
63. See the discussion in chapter four of GRIFFIN, supra note 19.
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This suggests wartime as a form of time is not the most relevant variable.
Enhanced government power has not been justified by the assertion that war is a
temporary time, but rather by the President making a compelling case that there is a
genuine threat to national security. The level of power granted to government then varies
with the nature of the threat, which helps explain why the Bush administration's
unilateralism became less persuasive over time, including with the Supreme Court.64 It is
one of the reasons President Truman lost the Steel Seizure case, something Dudziak
cannot explain using an analysis based on the idea that we have been in wartime for
decades.65 If we follow Dudziak's logic, the Court should have been impressed by the
wartime frame created by Truman's dramatic 1950 decision to intervene. Instead, the
Court closely interrogated presidential authority, something made easier by the fact that
Truman could not show that the labor strike at issue posed an imminent danger to troops
on a stalemated front line.66
To generate a more useful analysis across the wide range of military conflicts in
which America has engaged since World War II, we need to articulate and probe the
constitutional structure of the national security state that originated with the Cold War.
Ultimately, what drives Dudziak's analysis is her reaction to the atypical case of 9/11.
9/11 was atypical for many reasons. It was an attack on the United States itself -
something rare in recent memory. Even the Cold War did not have this feature. As
Dudziak describes, this is why so many Americans thought immediately of Pearl Harbor
as they watched the twin towers of the World Trade Center come down.67 While this
obviously assisted Bush as he likened the post-9/11 period to World War 1I, it led his
administration astray as this analogy provided no natural opening for him to educate the
public on the many novel features of the conflict against al-Qaeda, a non-state adversary
operating in many countries.68
As a consequence, we are still floundering in many respects in trying to understand
the ongoing war against al-Qaeda originally authorized by Congress after 9/11. Despite
Congress's arguable clarity in the September 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force
("AUMF"), one undisputable fact that will be studied by future historians is that many
observers, both international and domestic, never accepted the resulting conflict as "war"
and thus wartime. 69 I certainly agree with Dudziak that we do not want the framing of
wartime to determine our actions. Deciding that the conflict with al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan was a war was indeed a choice - one shared by many Americans, including
64. See Dudziak's summary in DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 120-27.
65. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952). For Dudziak's discussion
of the case, see DUDziAK, supra note 1, at 88-89.
66. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
67. DUDZIAK, supra note 1, at 99.
68. See BERGEN, supra note 32.
69. On this point, see Mary L. Dudziak, This War Is Not Over Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at A31;
Anna Stolley Persky, Lethal Force, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2012, available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/resources/publications/washingtonlawyer/march_2012/lethal-force.cfm;
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President Obama.70 What I would like Dudziak and others to see more clearly is that this
war was attended by democratic deliberation, however flawed, rather than being imposed
by an executive branch offering the assurance of a temporary wartime.
70. See JAMES MANN, THE OBAMIANS: THE STRUGGLE INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE TO REDEFINE AMERICAN
POWER 129-41 (2012) (discussing Obama's consistent public position in favor of greater efforts to prosecute
the war in Afghanistan).
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